Escalating tensions between Iran and Israel: A potential strike on Iranian Revolutionary Guard


 

13/10/2024

As the world waits for Israel’s response to the recent Iranian strike, it appears that the Israeli focus is increasingly aimed at targeting the Iranian Revolutionary Guard (IRGC).

Recent Israeli operations and attacks suggest that the strategic priority lies in launching significant strikes against key sites controlled by the IRGC, including its military bases, weapons manufacturing facilities and areas that influence its regional power.

This Israeli strategy is not in isolation from the latest developments in Lebanon. The shift in Israeli operations toward a direct confrontation with Hizbollah seems to be part of a broader plan to lay the groundwork for a larger strike on the IRGC. Israel is accelerating its efforts to neutralise Hizbollah, aiming to strip it of any leverage it could use to bring the security crisis into Israeli territory. This approach mirrors Israel’s past efforts in Gaza and the West Bank, where it focused on exhausting the Palestinian fighter factions and preventing them from posing a security threat.

Israel’s strategy of addressing security threats by concentrating on significant strikes against Hizbollah has also made Syria a direct battlefield in the ongoing conflict. Iranian targets in Syria have recently been hit by a series of strong Israeli attacks, primarily aiming to cut off the logistical supply lines that support Hizbollah. These strikes are not merely short-term responses, but part of a broader strategy to diminish Iran’s influence in Syria. Israel seems intent on altering the status quo by restricting the movement of Iran and Hizbollah, preventing them from creating alternative supply routes that could further destabilise Syria.

On the Lebanese front, Hizbollah may be facing crucial weeks ahead in its confrontation with Israel. The group’s current strategy focuses on inflicting as much damage as possible on Israel while maintaining the population void in northern Israel and preserving its ability to launch strikes, even if symbolic, into Israeli territory. Meanwhile, Israel seeks to intensify its operations against Hizbollah on multiple fronts, military, political and social. The primary objective is to isolate Hizbollah from its social and economic surroundings in Lebanon and to hold the group accountable for Lebanon’s deepening political and humanitarian crises.

Israel’s overarching goal through this strategy is to weaken Hizbollah’s military capabilities and turn the group into a burden on Lebanon. The intensive strikes aim to isolate Hizbollah and drain its logistical and operational resources, leading to its gradual weakening. This approach may extend beyond Lebanon, potentially reaching areas such as Iraq and Yemen, as part of Israel’s broader efforts to reduce Iran’s regional influence by weakening its proxies and achieve wider geopolitical objectives.

However, the biggest challenge for Israel remains the potential for its adversaries to activate multiple fronts against it. While these attacks may not significantly alter the balance of power in the conflict, they could lead to internal de-stabilisation within Israel. Repeated rocket strikes and drone attacks pose a substantial security threat to the Israeli government, fuelling fear among the public. This fear could be amplified if individual operations or actions by sleeper cells inside Israel increase, further pressuring the Israeli government as it tries to manage these open fronts.

In this tense environment, Israel appears determined to continue its military campaign on several fronts with a focus on weakening and disconnecting Iran from its regional proxies. Yet, maintaining this level of escalation over an extended period will be a considerable challenge, particularly if the attacks on Israeli territory persist and start to impact the country’s social and economic stability.

The test will be whether Israel can strip capability from Iran and its proxies before the internal price escalates to the point where its own population is no longer supportive of the strategy.

Dr. Amer Al Sabaileh