Category Archives: Politics

“Before and After” the Coup in Turkey

In Turkey, many signs have indicated the possibility of a military coup since 2013. Many reports refer to the level of discontent within the military establishment. According to those reports, Erdogan’s politics were the core source for numeral internal and external crisis; such crisis has also appeared within the same AKP especially after the continuous political dispute between Erdogna and his former colleagues.

In different scenarios, The Turkish politics were also subject to many doubts questioned by many countries, particularly when it comes to discuss the efficiency of the Turkish role in fighting terrorism, i.e. the role in Syria and controlling the waves of refuges to Europe.

Reviewing what happened in Turkey in the night of the 15th-16th of July, the first steps of the military coup showed that the operation is very systematic, well organized and nearly a successful process. This can be seen through these acts: seizing TV stations, announcing the fall of AKP government, deploying Tanks on the main bridges in Istanbul and Ankara, arresting top offices, controlling the military headquarter and launching coordinated attacks on police and security headquarters.

However, all changed in few hours, when Erdogan had the chance to talk on CNN Turk by Face Time application, which means that he couldn’t talk to any Turkish channel, asking people to take the streets. This call apparently was the game changer as the Coup was obviously relying on the curfew and the superiority of warplanes F16 and Apache which strangely looked so inefficient.

In all cases, the coup seems like an earthquake that will have its aftershocks inside Turkey, primarily on both levels security and economy. On the regional level, Erdogan will find himself very occupied dealing with internal issues which limit his capacity to be engaged in regional politics which gives him a very good chance to put an end to the crisis in the north of Syria.

Before the coupe attempt, the security situation in Turkey was already unstable, many attacks hit the Turkish cities which means that challenges coming from Erdgoan anti-Kurdish policies or the risk of war against terrorism will begin. Today, domestic security challenges are noticeably increasing, thus the after coupe strategy seems to work on the elimination of wide groups from within the Turkish state which will intensify the elements of chaos all over around. Therefore, this will definitely affect negatively the internal situation in Turkey that might suffer from the burdens of the coupe for a long-term of instability.

The other major risk, that Erdogan policies manifest a real desire to put an end to secularism in Turkey, which could also be one of the last few remaining centers of secularism in the Middle East. This will definitely create new attempts to launch the Islamists projects in Islamizing the whole region.

Dr. Amer Al Sabaileh

Recent developments in Syria

Since 2012, the US and its allies have many a time attempted to build a military power capable of holding its own in Syria. The last attempt, the “New Syrian Army” was a failure, as it was unable to liberate the area near Al Bukamal, in eastern Syria near the borders with Iraq, from Daesh. 
However, the failed mission might be the last concrete chance for the Obama administration to create a strong ally on the ground in Syria. 
The American target of all these attempts is fighting terrorism, and, at the same time, preventing Syrian regime forces from monopolising the push against Daesh for their own ends. 
But it seems that the US will not be able to have a real ally on the ground in Syria, that is why it will be impossible to replicate its achievements in Iraq, where it backs the Iraqi army.
Whereas Russia, for example, sees in the Syrian army a very strong ally on the ground; therefore, it is much easier to achieve concrete progress in recapturing territories occupied by Daesh. 
On the other hand, this new coming phase of the Syrian crisis might bring about some kind of coordination between the Russians and the Americans in their fight against terrorist groups, especially Jabhat Al Nusra. 
Moreover, some new developments in the region might have a positive impact on the Syrian crisis. 
Turkey’s warming of ties with Russia might extend to include a complete shift in its position on Egypt and even Syria. 
Less animosity from Turkey towards the Syrian regime, especially as Ankara busies itself in weeding out supporters of the failed coup, will reduce its involvement on the ground in Syria, putting an end to the escalation in various territories in the war-torn country. 
This also coincides with the desire of many countries to reopen political channels with Damascus, most notable in the visit of a European Parliament delegation to Syria earlier this month. 
The delegates were led by Javier Couso, vice chairman of the parliament’s foreign affairs committee.
Prior to that, news agencies reported that Syria’s General Security Directorate chief Mohammed Dib Zaitoun visited Rome, where he met with a number of Italian officials. 
Some agencies have reported as well that the head of Italy’s External Information and Security Agency, Gen. Alberto Manenti, will be heading a delegation to Damascus. 
Syrian officials are highly interested in negotiating the normalisation of relations with Italy and the abolition of the EU embargo on Syria, as the Italian delegation has already pledged to pave the way for EU-Syria rapprochement as soon as possible, according to international news reports.
At the regional level, observers are noticing a US interest in pushing the frozen Palestinian-Israeli peace process forward. This requires a mutual understanding and full coordination with Russia. 
Moreover, if the Obama administration is truly keen on taking a concrete step forward in the Mideast peace process, it has to at least ensure that a political solution in Syria will be launched.

Dr. Amer Al Sabaileh

قراءة في حيثيات الانقلاب في تركيا

كثير من المراقبين للمشهد التركي استطاعو- في الاسابيع الاخيرة- رصد تحركات نوعية تجاه تركيا، على مستويات متعددة، الدولي و الداخلي التركي بما فيها ايضاً رسائل قادمة المؤسسة العسكرية مما يشير الى اكتمال عوامل الاحتجاج الداخلي الذي قد يأخذ صورة تحرك عسكري خصوصاً مع ظهور حركة متعددة الاطراف داخل المؤسسة العسكرية تنتقد و تتحدث عن فشل السياسات التركية و خطر انعكاسها على الداخل التركي.
على الصعيد الدولي، تعلق المعطى الابرز بوصول دول حلف شمال الاطلسي الى قناعة راسخة بعدم قدرة الحلف على التعاطي مع الرئيس التركي و سياسته المنخرطة–وفقاً لقناعتات كثير من الدول- بملفات التأزيم الاقليمية التي لا يمكن التعاطي معها بعد الان.
اما على الصعيد الداخلي، فلا يمكن اسقاط ان التحرك العسكري  ق دسبقه  سيادة مناخ سلبي في الداخل التركي، بدأ بعمليات اقصاء ممنهجة للمعارضين لسياسة الرئيس التركي من خصومه و اصدقاءه على حد سواء، الامر الذي طور حالة من حالات العزلة السياسية الدولية الناتجة عن غياب الثقة لدى كثير من الاطراف الدولية بالرئيس التركي و نهجه. بالرغم من ذلك، شهدت الاسابيع الاخيرة و بعد الاطاحة برئيس الوزراء احمد داوود اوغلو بدأ اردوغان بتبني نهج تغيير راديكالي في السياسة الخارجية، بدأ في الاعتذار لموسكو مروراً بانجاز الاتفاق مع اسرائيل والبدء بارسال رسائل ايجابية لكافة خصوم اردوغان في المنطقة، مصر على سبيل المثال. 
بالعودة الى مسألة الانقلاب، ظهرت الخطوات الاولى للانقلاب و كأنها  تشير الى عملية ممنهجة و مدروسة بعناية و و بدت و كأنها تحظى بدعم دولي و ذلك يتضح من طريقة تغطية المحطات الدولية لاخبار الانقلاب او التصريحات القادمة في بداية المشهد من  المجتمع الدولي.
كذلك لا يمكن اسقاط الملاحظات التي مرت بها خطوات الاعلان عن الانقلاب و التي اشارت الى عملية منظمة و ممنهجة، بدءً من الاستيلاء على قيادة الاركان و اعتقال قائد الجيش، اغلاق منافذ مدينة انقرة و الجسور الحيوية و من ثم مدينة اسطنبول، ضرب مبنى المخابرات و من ثم مقر القوات الخاصة، اغلاق المطار و الاستيلاء على وكالة الاناضول و تلفزيون TRT، و من ثم اخلاء مبنى حزب العدالة و التنمية. 
الخطوة اللافتة لاحقاً هي عملية بث بيان مكتوب يشير ان تدخل الجيش جاء لحماية حقوق الانسان و الحريات من التغول و حماية علمانية الدولية وانهاء الفساد . و تضمن ذلك ايضاً رسالة للمجتمع الدولي بضرورة الحفاظ على العلاقات الدولية و حمايتها من تغول اي فئة و الاشارة الى محاكمة الخائنين للوطن في اشارة ان العملية مدروسة بعناية.
التغير الجذري على المشهد بدأ مع دعوة اردوغان عبر قناة Turk CNN للمواطنيين الاتراك بالنزول الى الشارع الامر الذي اظهر ان عناصر الجيش لم تكن مستعدة للمواجهة مع المواطنين، لا بل تفتقر لرؤية ما بعد الخطاب. فالمراقب للمشهد يدرك ان عناصر الجيش كانت مهيئة للتعامل مع عملية حظر تجوال اكثر من عملية مواجهة مباشرة، الامر الذي غير قواعد اللعبة.
 على كل الاحوال، لا يمكن اعتبار ان هذا الانقلاب بحكم المنتهي، فهو اشبه بزلزال مفاجئ لا بد ان تكون له هزات ارتدادية على الارض و خصوصاً في الداخل التركي اهمها على المستوى الامني الداخلي. فاعادة ترتيب المشهد الامني تحتاج الى عملية معقدة و تحتاج الى قدرة كبيرة على التعامل مع التهديدات الامنية الناتجة عن حالة الخلل الحالي و عوامل التهديد الاضافية (الارهاب، و المسألة الكردية). اهم ملامح المشهد التركي القادم قد تتلخص في انشغال تركيا بمشاكلها الداخلية و عزلها عن المشهد الاقليمي مما يعطي فرصة كبيرة للمجتمع الدولي لاعادة ترتيب اوراق المنطقة و طبيعة العلاقة القادمة مع تركيا ضمن اطر جديدة. فشل الانقلاب لا يعني عودة الامور الى سابق عهدها بالنسبة للرئيس التركي رجب طيب اردوغان، فالتصعيد الحاصل الان يشير ان ادارة ملفات السياسة التركية لا يمكن ان تستمر بالطريقة و النهج الذي كانت عليه، خصوصاً في مسألة العلاقة مع اطياف كبيرة من تركيبة الداخل التركي.
د.عامر السبايلة 

سوريا: الواقع على الارض و اعادة صياغة المواقف

القراءة المنطقية للاوضاع في سوريا تشير الى استفاذ الاطراف الدولية المنخرطة في الصراع لاوراقها على الارض. مما يعني ان تحولاً لافتاً لابد ان يطرأ على المشهد السوري بشقيه العسكري المتعلق بمكافحة الارهاب و السياسي المتعلق باخراج “جنيف ٣” من حالة الجمود التي يمر بها.

التنافس الامريكي الروسي في سوريا يبدو انه يسير باتجاه الحسم. فالفشل كان حليف كافة المحاولات الامريكية التي هدفت لبناء قوة عسكرية على الارض قادرة على لعب دور فعال في معادلة مكافحة الارهاب والتأثير على المشهد السياسي السوري. في المقابل استطاعت موسكو عبر تحالفها مع الجيش السوري ان تحدث تحولاً لافتاً في المسار العسكري على الارض، مما جعل واشنطن تسعى لكسر حصرية الانجاز “الروسي السوري” على الاقل في مسألة تحرير الرقة و المناطق المحيطة من داعش.  لكن مع سقوط اخر اوراق واشنطن المتمثلة ب “جيش سوريا الجديد” و خسارته الكبيرة في معركة البوكمال، فلابد ان تسعى الادارة الامريكية لصياغة نمط جديد من التفاهمات مع موسكو بحيث تنتقل الامور الى مرحلة التنسيق العلني و الذي يمثل اقراراً امريكياً بواقع القوى على الارض في سوريا و ضرورة التعاطي المباشر معه.

هذا يعني ان المرحلة القادمة لابد ان تشهد توافقات على نقاط الخلاف المتعددة بين الطرفين، اهمها، الاهداف الواجب استهدافها و طبيعة التعاطي مع الجماعات المسلحة بما فيها جبهة النصرة و من جهة اخرى الية تفعيل العملية السياسية و اخضاع جميع الاطراف للحل السياسي وفقاً للمعطيات الواقعية على الارض.

ضمن هذا الاطار تظهر عوامل اضافية مساعدة لفكرة انجاز الحل السياسي للازمة السورية، اهمها الموقف الاوروبي الجديد الذي بدأ يكسر تابوهات التعاطي مع الملف السوري و التي تم صياغتها في بداية الازمة السورية. فالاخبار المتعلقة بزيارات الوفود الاوروبية الي دمشق او العكس بدأت تتكرر بصورة تظهر تحولاً لافتاً في الموقف الاوروبي الذي لا بد ان يصل لنقطة الاعلان الرسمي عن هذه العلاقة.

من جهة أخرى لابد للاستدارة التركية السياسية تجاه روسيا و مجمل ملفات المنطقة ان تلقي بظلالها على طبيعة الموقف التركي من الازمة السورية، خصوصاً ان تركيا اليوم مضطرة للنأي بنفسها عن تهمتي تأزيم المنطقة سياسياً و تصعيد الاوضاع في سوريا عبر فتح الحدود و الدعم الموجه لكثير من الجماعات المقاتلة في سوريا.

على الصعيد الاقليمي، لم يعد خافياً على أحد حجم المحاولات الدولية المتكررة لتفعيل عملية السلام و اخراجها من حالة الجمود. منطقياً لابد ان تسعى الادارة الامريكية لتبني محاولات جادة لدفع عملية السلام او القيام بخطوات تنتهى بمساهمة حقيقية من قبل الرئيس أوباما “الحائز على جائزة نوبل للسلام” للتأسيس للحل او وضع صيغة جديدة للتسوية الاقليمية.

 يضاف الى ذلك تشكل مناخ من التفاهمات الروسية الامريكية التي ترى بها واشنطن حالة ايجابية يمكن توظيفها للضغط على جميع الاطراف تجاه القبول بالمحاولة الامريكية التي قد تأخذ في صورتها النهائية قراراً أممياً جديداً يبلور رؤية الادارة الامريكية للحل.

لهذا، اذا افترضنا ان الادارة الامريكية تحرص فعلياً الا تنتهي الشهور الاخيرة من عمرها دون احداث خطوات جذرية في ملف السلام، فهذا لا يمكن ان يتم قبلتنجاز  ترتيبات الملف السوري و اعلان انطلاق التسوية السياسية. لهذا لابد للمعطيات على الارض في سوريا أن تنعكس على شكل التفاهمات الدولية الجديدة و تعيد صياغة بعض المواقف بما يتناسب مع الواقع على الارض.

د.عامر السبايلة

amersabaileh@yahoo.com

Hope, cultural change needed to fight terrorism

The imminent capture of the city of Raqqa  and Mosul will lead to a crucial struggle with Daesh, a struggle that will enter a new phase where the terrorist groups will try to mount attacks everywhere, even by practicing more brutal terrorism. The idea of the ‘final battle’ promoted by ISIS gave a global dimension to their activities, therefore, even if ISIS losses its territories, more brutal groups might appear. Especially that today the more brutal those groups are, the better they become known. This also puts all aspects of civic life under serious threat, and it will be somehow impossible to secure all vital places, shopping malls, universities, public transportations etc. For example, it is impossible to make an airport secure, unless it is closed. These attacks and threats are damaging tourism and the transport system and at the end it costs almost nothing — one man with a Kalashnikov through a simple act has a very high effect.

These challenges should urge Arab governments to adopt wide-reaching measures to assuage frustration among the region’s youth, so as to block ISIS’s main sources of recruitment since the terror group increases attacks on civilian targets worldwide.

There is a real need to face the problem in various way; ISIS doctrine can be faced just when it becomes violent. There is an urgent need to revise the roots o the problem. For example, Analyzing ISIS doctrine will lead to the origin of the problem. In this context, the issue of the final battle declared by ISIS “Armageddon” represents a good food of thought to see the origin of this vision. Many Arab and Muslim world governments for many years participated in shaping the legend of Armageddon through narrations or curricula books etc, without noticing that this is rooting in the mind of people an idea that can turn on later to a very dangerous issue, the same goes for narrations like those of the conquer of Constantinople and Rome. It is the time to be true and courageous to face the problem and put an end to the sources of the evolution of violence.

The war against ISIS should also include a war against autocracy, corruption, poverty, unemployment,inequality and failure in development.

 It is the time that elements of life win over elements of death in people’s life. It is time to make people stop seeing the future in flashbacks because they can’t integrate with the future. They take refuge in the idea of utopia because they think they will go to heaven. Nonetheless, if they could experience in this life, what do they expect in heaven? Would they really still kill themselves to go to heaven?” If they felt appreciated, wouldn’t they see their life as precious? If they have more elements of life in their lives, would they leave life to go to an unknown destiny?

There are some glimmers of hope in some countries, yet what is needed is a global alliance for a cultural revolution that cannot be achieved without a long-term strategy. Moreover, leaders should stop viewing the war against ISIS in terms of the G.W.Bush ‘’war on terror.’ Therefore, the mandate of the new UN secretary general should consider the option of the “Cultural Revolution”. Another idea is that Aid donations should be directed to projects that give life to people, without neglecting the cultural side, art, literature, cinema, sport which are all things that could give hope to change the life of millions of young people and save them from joining terrorist groups as many of their predecessors have.


Dr. Amer Al Sabaileh

Jordan Times

Need for effective change

On the 16th of Nov 2015, I published in The Jordan Times an article that has the title “In the absence of favorable living conditions”. This article highlighted the signs of the reoccurrence of the social protests, and this may indicate that the “Hirak” protests movement is expected to reborn. However, recently Jordan is witnessing a kind of upheavals that started in “Theban”, near Madaba, and pulled the trigger for many expected coming movements in other cities, like Tafielh for example.

It is important in this context to analyze these protests from a scientific point of view in order to understand the reasons behind it.  Moreover, it is important to deal with these protests in a wider perspective not limited to the idea of service-demands or looking for job opportunities.  This is right time that decision makers must intervene efficiently, and put an end to the state of denial in which many officials are living in.

Since 2001, problems in Jordan are not being solved resourcefully, but they were postponed. Most of the surface conflicts have turned to be latent ones which means that the problem is always there and it needs just a simple prompt to reappear on the surface, as the conditions which the city of Ma’an witnessed, and which then turned to be almost serious clashes.

No one can ignore the clear signs of failure in the process of development in many Jordanian cities.  Therefore, it would be much better to face these challenges courageously and work in implementing a concrete change instead of living in a bubble of illusion that prevents us as Jordanians from seeing all signs of the present and future risks.

From another side, it would be wrong to keep linking the ongoing protests with the poor life conditions; it is also a matter of political request, a call for social justice, equality and a youth struggle to take their legitimate role in building their future. Dealing with these problems should be built on a complete transformation in the way politics are being run in the country, especially that many notice today there is no change achieved after years of uprising and chaos in the region. In Jordan, same people are dominating the political scene leaving no hope for youth to dream about having an opportunity to participate in building their society.

Today, the level of violence is noticeably increasing, and any chaos might turn easily to bloody clashes. The other risk is that Jordan has already entered the phase of open confrontation with terrorism; therefore, it is very critical to manage any internal crisis wisely. Consequently, raising some questions regarding the challenge that the Jordanian society is facing would be a good point to start either by realizing the upcoming security challenges or stopping against the continuous growth of radical movements.

There is an urgent need to act concretely, with new tools, faces and language that can provide real solutions to the pending problems and counter extremist ideologies and the waves of radicalism that are coming closer to our shores.

Dr. Amer Al Sabaileh

Jordan Times

DESTABILIZZARE PER STABILIZZARE

DESTABILIZZARE PER STABILIZZARE

L’attentato dei giorni scorsi nell’aeroporto di Istanbul deve essere inquadrato in un decisa strategia della tensione messa in atto da forze interne al governo turco.

Non dobbiamo pensare che l’azione sia stata autoprodotta ,ma certamente le autorità hanno inspiegabilmente abbassato le difese proprio in un aeroporto che sappiamo essere obiettivo primario in questo momento.

I servizi di sicurezza avevano  preventivamente segnalato   un ipotesi di attacco in aeroporto come si può sottovalutare una simile informazione.

Oggi, ogni aeroporto rappresenta il primo obiettivo sensibile da difendere con modalità non ordinaria.

Erdogan ed i suoi oppositori interni al suo stesso partito vogliono spingere il paese verso una deriva antidemocratica per poi regolare i conti al loro interno, ma per far questo hanno bisogno di tensione ed attacchi continui che giustifichino risposte dure, alleanze strane, nuovi e vecchi accordi da ripristinare.

Sarebbe molto interessante conoscere nei dettagli le armi che sono state usate dai terroristi, se ad esempio gli AK 47 usati  nell’attacco ed il loro munizionamento sono di fabbricazione romena, potrebbero far parte di un lotto recentemente triangolato sul territorio turco, cosi come l’esplosivo utilizzato se proveniente dall’ex Jugoslavia proverebbe in via esclusiva che la logistica dell’operazione è interna.

Forti dubbi vengono, infatti, sollevati sulle attività  preventiva  della polizia turca.

Negli aeroporti di tutto il mondo i protocolli di difesa si sono uniformati e prevedono tempi di reazione bassissimi verso una minaccia, parliamo di 40 secondi per neutralizzare la sorgente del fuoco.

Così non è avvenuto ad Istanbul , nonostante dall’inizio dell’anno gli attentati con vittime sul territorio turco sono stati numerosi e la modalità difensiva e di prevenzione sia teoricamente al massimo livello operativo e cioè “attacco in corso” .

Infine occorre valutare la scarsissima azione preventiva della Polizia turca nel perimetro aeroportuale che normalmente viene filtrato con personale di sicurezza in borghese e da personale in divisa con cani anti esplosivo.

Le versioni ufficiali che descrivono l’attacco sono state fino ad ora lacunose e contraddittorie, non sono stati resi disponibili i filmati dello scontro a fuoco neppure alle agenzie di intelligence amiche nonostante nella zona interessata insistono almeno 60 telecamere brandeggianti ad alta definizione.

Infine non convincono questi ripetuti attacchi ad un paese islamico dove vengono uccisi musulmani, nonostante proprio l’ambiguità di comportamento turco abbia permesso allo stato islamico fino ad ora di sopravvivere.  

 

© RIPRODUZIONE RISERVATA

DESTABILIZZARE PER STABILIZZARE

DESTABILIZZARE PER STABILIZZARE

L’attentato dei giorni scorsi nell’aeroporto di Istanbul deve essere inquadrato in un decisa strategia della tensione messa in atto da forze interne al governo turco.

Non dobbiamo pensare che l’azione sia stata autoprodotta ,ma certamente le autorità hanno inspiegabilmente abbassato le difese proprio in un aeroporto che sappiamo essere obiettivo primario in questo momento.

I servizi di sicurezza avevano  preventivamente segnalato   un ipotesi di attacco in aeroporto come si può sottovalutare una simile informazione.

Oggi, ogni aeroporto rappresenta il primo obiettivo sensibile da difendere con modalità non ordinaria.

Erdogan ed i suoi oppositori interni al suo stesso partito vogliono spingere il paese verso una deriva antidemocratica per poi regolare i conti al loro interno, ma per far questo hanno bisogno di tensione ed attacchi continui che giustifichino risposte dure, alleanze strane, nuovi e vecchi accordi da ripristinare.

Sarebbe molto interessante conoscere nei dettagli le armi che sono state usate dai terroristi, se ad esempio gli AK 47 usati  nell’attacco ed il loro munizionamento sono di fabbricazione romena, potrebbero far parte di un lotto recentemente triangolato sul territorio turco, cosi come l’esplosivo utilizzato se proveniente dall’ex Jugoslavia proverebbe in via esclusiva che la logistica dell’operazione è interna.

Forti dubbi vengono, infatti, sollevati sulle attività  preventiva  della polizia turca.

Negli aeroporti di tutto il mondo i protocolli di difesa si sono uniformati e prevedono tempi di reazione bassissimi verso una minaccia, parliamo di 40 secondi per neutralizzare la sorgente del fuoco.

Così non è avvenuto ad Istanbul , nonostante dall’inizio dell’anno gli attentati con vittime sul territorio turco sono stati numerosi e la modalità difensiva e di prevenzione sia teoricamente al massimo livello operativo e cioè “attacco in corso” .

Infine occorre valutare la scarsissima azione preventiva della Polizia turca nel perimetro aeroportuale che normalmente viene filtrato con personale di sicurezza in borghese e da personale in divisa con cani anti esplosivo.

Le versioni ufficiali che descrivono l’attacco sono state fino ad ora lacunose e contraddittorie, non sono stati resi disponibili i filmati dello scontro a fuoco neppure alle agenzie di intelligence amiche nonostante nella zona interessata insistono almeno 60 telecamere brandeggianti ad alta definizione.

Infine non convincono questi ripetuti attacchi ad un paese islamico dove vengono uccisi musulmani, nonostante proprio l’ambiguità di comportamento turco abbia permesso allo stato islamico fino ad ora di sopravvivere.  

 

© RIPRODUZIONE RISERVATA

SIRTE

SIRTE

Il recente attacco alle porte di Sirte in Libia conclusosi per ora con una parziale vittoria di Al Sarraj ha visto nella realtà scendere in campo a fianco dei soldati libici, numerosi commandos  di truppe speciali europee.

Nel dettaglio sono intervenuti reparti di Elite militari francesi, inglesi, americani ed italiani.

Le operazioni sono considerate di “Intelligence Attivo “ e gestite con la massima riservatezza e coperte dal segreto di Stato dai vari paesi coinvolti.

Nel caso di specie attendibili fonti locali indicano che le forze speciali francesi da tempo schierate in Libia sotto copertura nell’Area di Tobruk sono intervenute nella battaglia di Sirte con uccisione mirate e chirurgiche al fine di tagliare la linea logistica di rifornimento dello Stato Islamico.

Sono stati usati dai francesi appositi sistemi d’armi molto sofisticati con mortai trasportabili a puntamento telematico con designatore sul terreno; le azioni sono tutte andate a buon fine isolando sul lato orientale di Sirte gli uomini del Califfato.

La stampa internazionale non parla dell’intervento francese per chiari motivi di riservatezza, ma il lavoro più incisivo in questa fase  è chiaro che è stato fatto dai francesi che hanno ridotto al minimo la capacità di fuoco degli uomini del califfato.

L’intelligence americana ha fini ad ora operato con caccia da ricognizione e nella fase successiva ed operativa una volta acquisite le giuste informAzioni con Droni a pilotaggio remoto.

Predator armati  con missili a guida laser AGM – 114RS HELLFIRE II di fabbricazione statunitense.

Il pilotaggio remoto americano è gestito direttamente dalla CIA  le operation rooms sono basate nel vecchio aeroporto militare  di Sigonella in Sicilia Italia, in un’area apparentemente dismessa ma ancora utilizzata in forma anonima dall’intelligence americana come location per la logistica delle operazioni in Nord Africa.

Sul territorio libico gli Special Forces americani ed italiani sono invece insediati nell’area compresa tra Harawa, Nufaliya, Bin Jawade  ed Ajdabiya a metà strada tra Bengasi e Tripoli verso i campi petroliferi.

Gli uomini Usa e italiani vestono abiti borghesi tanto da confondersi con disinvoltura con una delle tante milizie  libiche che operano nella zona.

Sono equipaggiati con fucili d’assalto  Colt M4 perfetti per l’elitrasporto e Colt M16, per le armi da fianco utilizzano prevalentemente pistole semiautomatiche Glock 19 e 17 cal. 9×21 e cal.40 di fabbricazione austriaca.

I fucili sono predisposti anche al lancio di granate con sistema di puntamento laser.

Gli americani provengono dai Rangers dei Marines e dai Navy  Seals e sono scelti per le loro caratteristiche particolarmente adatte alla guerriglia urbana dove preparazione fisica e tecnica sono fondamentali.

Gli Italiani invece provengono dagli alpini paracadutisti, dal reparto Col Moschin e dagli incursori della Marina Militare COMSUBIN – GOI  e sono inquadrati nell’organico del TF 45 unità militare segreta che opera da anni nelle missioni cosiddette fantasma, utilizzano gli stessi armamenti individuali degli americani.

Il TF 45 nella riconquista di Sirte stà operando prevalentemente nella preparazione degli scontri urbani e nel controllo dell’area portuale.

L’intelligence inglese stà invece utilizzando gli uomini della S.A.S.  e della S.O.C.  con incursioni aeree e bombardamenti mirati. Sul terreno utilizza unità di bonifica quartieri che sono penetrate nella periferia di Sirte, grazie anche all’utilizzo di esperti Snipers equipaggiati con fucili di precisione M200 ONEY TAC e BARRET M 95 calibro 50 (12.7 mm).

 

© RIPRODUZIONE RISERVATA

SIRTE

SIRTE

Il recente attacco alle porte di Sirte in Libia conclusosi per ora con una parziale vittoria di Al Sarraj ha visto nella realtà scendere in campo a fianco dei soldati libici, numerosi commandos  di truppe speciali europee.

Nel dettaglio sono intervenuti reparti di Elite militari francesi, inglesi, americani ed italiani.

Le operazioni sono considerate di “Intelligence Attivo “ e gestite con la massima riservatezza e coperte dal segreto di Stato dai vari paesi coinvolti.

Nel caso di specie attendibili fonti locali indicano che le forze speciali francesi da tempo schierate in Libia sotto copertura nell’Area di Tobruk sono intervenute nella battaglia di Sirte con uccisione mirate e chirurgiche al fine di tagliare la linea logistica di rifornimento dello Stato Islamico.

Sono stati usati dai francesi appositi sistemi d’armi molto sofisticati con mortai trasportabili a puntamento telematico con designatore sul terreno; le azioni sono tutte andate a buon fine isolando sul lato orientale di Sirte gli uomini del Califfato.

La stampa internazionale non parla dell’intervento francese per chiari motivi di riservatezza, ma il lavoro più incisivo in questa fase  è chiaro che è stato fatto dai francesi che hanno ridotto al minimo la capacità di fuoco degli uomini del califfato.

L’intelligence americana ha fini ad ora operato con caccia da ricognizione e nella fase successiva ed operativa una volta acquisite le giuste informAzioni con Droni a pilotaggio remoto.

Predator armati  con missili a guida laser AGM – 114RS HELLFIRE II di fabbricazione statunitense.

Il pilotaggio remoto americano è gestito direttamente dalla CIA  le operation rooms sono basate nel vecchio aeroporto militare  di Sigonella in Sicilia Italia, in un’area apparentemente dismessa ma ancora utilizzata in forma anonima dall’intelligence americana come location per la logistica delle operazioni in Nord Africa.

Sul territorio libico gli Special Forces americani ed italiani sono invece insediati nell’area compresa tra Harawa, Nufaliya, Bin Jawade  ed Ajdabiya a metà strada tra Bengasi e Tripoli verso i campi petroliferi.

Gli uomini Usa e italiani vestono abiti borghesi tanto da confondersi con disinvoltura con una delle tante milizie  libiche che operano nella zona.

Sono equipaggiati con fucili d’assalto  Colt M4 perfetti per l’elitrasporto e Colt M16, per le armi da fianco utilizzano prevalentemente pistole semiautomatiche Glock 19 e 17 cal. 9×21 e cal.40 di fabbricazione austriaca.

I fucili sono predisposti anche al lancio di granate con sistema di puntamento laser.

Gli americani provengono dai Rangers dei Marines e dai Navy  Seals e sono scelti per le loro caratteristiche particolarmente adatte alla guerriglia urbana dove preparazione fisica e tecnica sono fondamentali.

Gli Italiani invece provengono dagli alpini paracadutisti, dal reparto Col Moschin e dagli incursori della Marina Militare COMSUBIN – GOI  e sono inquadrati nell’organico del TF 45 unità militare segreta che opera da anni nelle missioni cosiddette fantasma, utilizzano gli stessi armamenti individuali degli americani.

Il TF 45 nella riconquista di Sirte stà operando prevalentemente nella preparazione degli scontri urbani e nel controllo dell’area portuale.

L’intelligence inglese stà invece utilizzando gli uomini della S.A.S.  e della S.O.C.  con incursioni aeree e bombardamenti mirati. Sul terreno utilizza unità di bonifica quartieri che sono penetrate nella periferia di Sirte, grazie anche all’utilizzo di esperti Snipers equipaggiati con fucili di precisione M200 ONEY TAC e BARRET M 95 calibro 50 (12.7 mm).

 

© RIPRODUZIONE RISERVATA